Novos dados revelam novamente a devastação econômica da Europa. E suas origens estão diretamente ligadas com o poder americano.
Trump's "America First" manifesto suggests that is what he will do. By closing down the war racket that was driven by the Biden administration, the conflict will come to a much-needed prompt end.
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As the dust settles after a tumultuous U.S. presidential election, the magnitude of Donald Trump's victory becomes clearer. His decisive win to become the 47th president of the American Republic is an emphatic popular mandate for change.
This could enable Trump to bring the disastrous U.S.-led proxy war in Ukraine against Russia to a peaceful end, as Francis Boyle, a respected American professor of international law, remarked this week.
Going into the election, the stakes could not have been higher. A continuation of the nearly three-year-old conflict – as would have happened if the Democrats had remained in power – was potentially leading to World War Three and a nuclear conflagration. Trump had starkly warned of that imminent danger. A central part of his election platform was a pledge to push for a diplomatic resolution.
At 78, Donald J Trump becomes the only second president in U.S. history to win two non-consecutive terms. The last figure to do that was Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, in 1892, as noted by Martin Sieff, a seasoned observer of American elections.
What makes Trump's political comeback so astonishing is the defiance of the establishment and the mainstream media, which for the most part was staunchly supporting his rival, Kamala Harris. "Every dirty trick, lie and scare tactic in the history of American politics – which is filled with them – was used against him. They all failed," wrote Sieff this week.
The pre-election polls, right up to voting day on November 5, weren't even close, as it turned out. Trump swept the electoral map, taking even the supposedly battleground states, to win by more than 4 million popular votes. He also stormed past the crucial threshold of 270 to win over 300 electoral college votes.
The key factor for his triumph was the economy which Trump tapped into. Bound up in the economic tribulations for ordinary Americans is the militarism and warmongering that the Democrats have become associated with. The callous lack of priority to address pressing social and economic needs of poor, working Americans that the Biden administration and his vice president Kamala Harris had displayed over the past four years was matched by their license to fund the war in Ukraine to the tune of hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars.
There was also the factor of the Biden administration's appalling complicity in the Israeli genocide in Gaza over the past year. Millions of Muslim, Arab and young voters who would normally vote Democrat were outraged and disgusted. They refused to give Harris their votes. Trump is no friend of the Palestinian people, but at least he could not be accused of complicity in genocide the way Biden and Harris indelibly are.
Not only does Trump win the White House decisively, his Republican Party also took back control of the Senate and looks like maintaining its majority in the House of Representatives. With that dominance in the executive and legislative branches of government, the second Trump administration will be able to implement his program without impediment. His previous administration (2016-2020) was hampered by Democrats and the corporate-controlled media over spurious claims about "Russia collusion". That propaganda farce is obsolete.
The authority of Trump's political position makes it propitious for him to follow through on his election pledge to end the conflict in Ukraine.
Trump has boasted that he can end the war in 24 hours. That is typical bluster from the former real estate magnate. The signs are that Russia has its own clear-sighted objectives and will not be swayed from achieving them. Russia is done with Western duplicity. It is determined to defeat the Kiev NeoNazi regime, to retain its newly regained historic territories, and to ensure whatever is left of the rump Ukrainian state that it will never join the NATO military alliance.
Russia's military victory in Ukraine is as assured as it is righteous and legally correct. Moscow will set its own terms and is not looking for U.S. approval under Trump or anyone else.
What Trump can do to expedite the end of the bloodshed and establish peace is to immediately sever the reckless military aid to the Kiev regime.
Trump's "America First" manifesto suggests that is what he will do. By closing down the war racket that was driven by the Biden administration, the conflict will come to a much-needed prompt end.
This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Trump on his election and said that Moscow was open for reasonable dialogue. But it seems patent that the dialogue will be about accepting the eminently reasonable conditions that Russia had always offered – no NATO expansion into Ukraine and recognition of the principle of indivisible security for all.
As Putin categorically stated in a speech at the Valdai forum this week, the United States and its NATO allies must henceforth disabuse themselves of any notion about "strategically defeating Russia". Putin's speech was a wide-ranging philosophical worldview in which he also said the era of Western hegemony is definitively over – and for the common good of the planet.
The United States can choose to be part of a multipolar world coexisting as equals with all other nations abiding by international law. But its nefarious ambitions of unipolar privilege are no longer tenable. The conflict in Ukraine and Russia's defiance of U.S.-led NATO aggression has demonstrated the new geopolitical reality. In this new more just order, NATO is an anachronism.
The emergence of BRICS is another harbinger of Western imperial demise.
Trump is a pragmatic deal-maker. He is not imbued with the ideological obsession of empire as the U.S. establishment and the Democrats are. There also seems to be a decent sense of humanity in Trump despite his brashness. When he denounces the horror of the war in Ukraine, it seems to reflect a genuine abhorrence at the slaughter and a desire for diplomacy to prevail.
It now remains to be seen who Trump selects as his cabinet when he takes office in 70 days following the presidential inauguration on January 20. If he surrounds himself with people like Robert Kennedy Jr and Tulsi Gabbard who have been vociferous in their criticism of the Ukraine proxy war and who have urged a reasonable, diplomatic attitude towards Russia then the signs are hopeful that the U.S. has made a significant step towards pursuing peaceful relations.
If on the other hand Trump returns hawkish figures like Mike Pompeo and Richard Grenell then his second term will end up like his first one and there will be a woefully missed historic opportunity for detente with Russia.
One thing seems clear. The election shows that the American people have repudiated the warmongering establishment and their lackey warmongering media. All the messaging, gaslighting and perception management was ignored. The Mighty Wurlitzer, as the CIA operative Frank Wisner once marveled as the power of the U.S. propaganda media, is now badly out of tune and wheezing.
Trump needs to listen to the American people and deliver on his promise for peace.
Novos dados revelam novamente a devastação econômica da Europa. E suas origens estão diretamente ligadas com o poder americano.
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O ex-chefe do Banco Central Europeu, Mario Draghi, recentemente apresentou um extenso relatório à União Europeia que demonstra como os europeus estão ficando para trás dos americanos – e até dos asiáticos – em questões-chave do desenvolvimento econômico.
Se, em 1990, o PIB per capita nos Estados Unidos era 16% maior do que na zona do euro, em 2023 essa diferença já havia aumentado para mais de 30%. Isso significa que os americanos estão cada vez mais ricos que os europeus.
Mas o gap entre os homens mais ricos dos EUA e da Europa também está aumentando. Apenas 10% dos empresários de alta tecnologia no top 30 e no top 500 do ranking de capitalização de mercado são europeus. Em comparação, 73% no primeiro e 56% no segundo são americanos.
Esses novos dados revelam novamente a devastação econômica da Europa. E suas origens estão diretamente ligadas com o poder americano.
Na década de 1930, os Estados Unidos haviam perdido toda a vantagem que haviam ganho sobre seus competidores europeus ao término da I Guerra Mundial. A Europa estava devastada e Washington havia surgido como a grande superpotência econômica do mundo. Contudo, a crise de 1929 levou essa pujança por água abaixo. A grande depressão parecia ter acabado com o sonho americano.
Assim como a I Guerra foi uma disputa entre as potências imperialistas pelo mercado mundial, a futura II Guerra precisava ser desencadeada para que os americanos retomassem o controle – perdido parcialmente para a Alemanha e o Japão no rastro da crise da década de 1930. Franklin D. Roosevelt liderou a reorganização da economia americana, expandindo vastamente os gastos federais e realizando grandes investimentos públicos graças a uma centralização ditatorial do poder econômico nas mãos de um pequeno monopólio de corporações.
O resultado foi um aumento inimaginável na produção industrial – voltado quase exclusivamente para a guerra. Pearl Harbor veio muito a calhar: era a desculpa que o regime precisava para eliminar a oposição à sua entrada no conflito. Entre 1941 e 1944, a produção de guerra dos EUA mais que triplicou, e em 1944 as suas fábricas já produziam o dobro do volume de Alemanha, Itália e Japão.
A produção industrial americana serviu a dois objetivos estratégicos entrelaçados: destruir a Europa e reconstruí-la à sua imagem e semelhança. Os EUA equiparam a Inglaterra com os armamentos necessários para fazer frente à Alemanha e ambos executaram a campanha de intensos bombardeios com a intenção explícita de destruir a economia alemã, o motor industrial da Europa. Foram despejadas quase 2,7 milhões de toneladas de bombas sobre a Alemanha e as regiões ocupadas pelos nazistas em outros países, particularmente França e Bélgica (completando o coração industrial da Europa). Os bombardeios aéreos americanos e ingleses mataram 305 mil alemães, feriram quase 800 mil, destruíram total ou parcialmente 5,5 milhões de moradias e deixaram 20 milhões sem os serviços essenciais de utilidade pública.
Foi um genocídio. Somado à matança imediata de 330.000 civis no Japão graças às bombas atômicas de Hiroshima e Nagasaki, os bombardeios dos Estados Unidos tiraram a vida de 635 mil pessoas.
A destruição da Europa pelos Estados Unidos foi um grande negócio que beneficiou os Estados Unidos de maneira decisiva para que pudessem garantir sua supremacia total na nova ordem mundial pós-guerra. O déficit dos países estrangeiros, em 1946-47, era de mais de 19 bilhões de dólares. Os EUA, que estavam intactos, ofereceram empréstimos para iniciar a reconstrução da Europa como uma forma branda de colonização, enquanto, ao mesmo tempo, castigavam severamente aqueles países. Nas palavras do insuspeito Arthur S. Link, historiador do establishment, "o Governo americano, mesmo durante os amargos dias da Reconstrução, jamais praticara tão terrível vingança contra antigos inimigos." O povo e as instituições alemãs foram reformados "à imagem dos Estados Unidos".
A Doutrina Truman e, principalmente, o Plano Marshall, foram o pilar da política de colonização da Europa pelos EUA pós-II Guerra Mundial: a primeira transformou toda a Europa Ocidental e parte do seu sudeste em uma enorme base militar americana, através da OTAN, policiando a política desses países. A segunda começou como uma política clientelista, concedendo esmolas para os famintos europeus (11 bilhões de dólares) para, no entanto, serem devolvidos com juros posteriormente, iniciando o processo de dependência econômica, política e social da Europa. Entre 1948 e 1951, outros 12 bilhões haviam sido gastos nesse sentido.
O combate à falsa ameaça da União Soviética era a desculpa encontrada pelo governo americano para capturar a Europa. "A maior nação da Terra", declarou perante o Senado o republicado Arthur Vandenberg, "terá de justificar ou abandonar a sua liderança". Foi assim que os Estados Unidos conseguiram se livrar de uma crise de superprodução e escoar suas mercadorias e armamentos, ao mesmo tempo deixando os europeus reféns das dívidas acumuladas. Os produtos americanos invadiram a Europa e a OTAN passou a controlar os exércitos nacionais.
Por um lado, o avassalamento da Europa pós-II Guerra teve como contrapartida para a estabilização social um relativo bem-estar da população. Contudo, a partir da segunda grande estratégia de colonização americana – a desindustrialização com a imposição das políticas neoliberais nas décadas de 1980 e 1990 –, esse estado de bem-estar foi desmontado para deixar os europeus completamente reféns dos EUA.
Em todos os países do mundo, o principal responsável pela pesquisa e desenvolvimento da ciência são as forças armadas. Contudo, os exércitos da Europa se tornaram vassalos dos Estados Unidos através da OTAN e sua capacidade foi reduzida para elevar a das forças americanas no continente. O relatório encomendado pela UE a Draghi destaca as consequências nefastas dessa submissão para a Europa.
Segundo o relatório, os europeus gastam metade do que os americanos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento em relação ao PIB, e muitos empresários europeus preferem migrar para os Estados Unidos a fim de desenvolver essas atividades. O gasto em P&D em relação ao PIB na União Europeia é também menor do que os da China, Reino Unido, Taiwan e Coreia do Sul. A UE já foi ultrapassada pela China no número de artigos publicados nas principais revistas científicas e Japão e Índia estão no seu encalço – enquanto os EUA continuam à frente. A capacidade econômica de inovação na Europa também permanece abaixo da de EUA e Japão. Ela já ficou para trás no desenvolvimento de tecnologia digital.
Draghi sugere uma série de "medidas drásticas" para combater o crescente gap entre EUA e Europa, de acordo com o Politico. No entanto, dificilmente essas medidas terão algum efeito, uma vez que a política da União Europeia continua absolutamente alinhada (isto é, dependente) à dos Estados Unidos e recentemente não foi adotada nenhuma medida relevante que indique um caminho distinto daquele que vem sendo tomado nas últimas décadas.
É por isso que há um descontentamento crescente, não apenas na população comum dos países do bloco, mas também entre setores influentes das elites políticas e econômicas europeias. O crescimento da extrema-direita na Alemanha, França, Itália, Holanda, Áustria, bem como a busca dos governos de Hungria e Eslováquia por uma maior soberania, são reflexos claros dessa tendência.
El veto brasileño en contra del ingreso de Venezuela al BRICS crea más problemas para Brasilia que para la misma Caracas.
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Aparentemente el gobierno de Lula está convencido de su decisión de crear hostilidades diplomáticas con Venezuela. Luego de negarse a reconocer la victoria democrática del presidente Nicolás Maduro, en las últimas elecciones presidenciales, Brasil asumió un paso aún mucho más grave en las relaciones bilaterales al vetar la postulación de Caracas para ser miembro del BRICS rompiendo así una larga tradición de respeto mutuo entre brasileños y venezolanos.
El veto de Brasil no solo se limitó a la posibilidad de condición de miembro de Venezuela sino que Brasilia impidió que Caracas fuera admitida como "estado asociado" bajo las condiciones del nuevo status intermedio creadas durante la Cumbre de Kazán. Si hubiese sido admitida Venezuela habría tenido un mayor rol en los procesos internos del BRICS, sin que – no obstante—se hubiese convertido en miembro completo. Ni siquiera eso fue aceptado por el gobierno de Brasil que enfatizó su desaprobación al ingreso de Caracas a cualquier condición dentro del bloque.
Por supuesto que la decisión brasileña fue duramente condenada por el gobierno venezolano. Para Maduro y su equipo Lula sencillamente ha dejado de ser un aliado. La histórica alianza de la izquierda política de América Latina ha sido destruida. Lula ahora es visto por los venezolanos como un político hostil – como también por los nicaragüenses quienes recientemente de manera mutua rompieron relaciones con Brasil luego de una serie de hostilidades políticas iniciadas por el lado brasileño.
Por otra parte, aunque no ha habido una declaración oficial para estos efectos, es posible sostener que ni siquiera los otros miembros del BRICS están satisfechos con la actitud de Brasil. Para Rusia y China y en menor medida Irán, Venezuela es un socio absolutamente indispensable en lo comercial, lo político y lo militar en América Latina y es un gran aliado para los intereses multipolares en América Latina y que ha creado un verdadero eje de resistencia contra la hegemonía de Estados Unidos en el continente. Obviamente, esto radica en el interés de estos países de dar la bienvenida a Venezuela en los BRICS lo cual indica que la decisión de Brasil podría haberse visto como incorrecta.
Existe entre los BRICS un prevaleciente respeto por el liderazgo regional de cada país miembro. Con toda certeza los otros países no estuvieron de acuerdo con la opinión de Brasil sobre Venezuela, pero aún así respetan a Brasil, la evaluación que este hace dentro de su propio ambiente estratégico. Este respecto no significa que no habrá un sacudón en la confianza de los otros países. Es obvio que no habrá una condena o ruptura, pero es posible que algunos dirigentes de los BRICS verán a Brasil con mayor desconfianza de ahora en adelante, considerando que por lo menos en el caso venezolano, Brasilia claramente sirvió los intereses norteamericanos en detrimento de la multipolaridad.
Las principales consecuencias negativas de este proceso, afectan al mismo Brasil.
Incluso fuera de los BRICS Venezuela continuará siendo un socio confiable para los países miembros, pero Brasil bien podría ser visto como un representante de los intereses norteamericanos en América del Sur y no necesariamente por los países del BRICS, pero por los líderes anti hegemonistas en el ambiente geoestratégico brasileño. Lula tiende a permanecer aislado con unos pocos aliados a nivel regional, contando actualmente solo con el gobierno colombiano para garantizar a Brasil una proyección regional.
Al provocar hostilidades con Venezuela, Lula ha disminuido la relevancia del liderazgo regional de Brasil. La imagen de Brasil como un país diplomáticamente fuerte, integrado con sus vecinos está siendo borrada – y reemplazada por la imagen de un estado que no puede resistir la presión de EE.UU. para antagonizar a los líderes multilateralistas sudamericanos.
Tal como lo suponían algunos analistas más experimentados, Lula es muy "diferente" en su nuevo período, mucho más frágil frente a la presión occidental y cede en vitales aspectos estratégicos, creando así problemas para Brasil como un todo y para su propio futuro como político. Es posible decir que la injustificable hostilidad hacia Venezuela, la cual culminó con el veto en los BRICS, verdaderamente ha defraudado al mundo respecto de la política exterior de Brasil la cual no parece estar siguiendo debidamente el actual proceso de transición geopolítica hacia la multilateralidad.
Traducción desde el inglés por Sergio R. Anacona
Reality may be very different from Republican rhetoric.
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Despite Donald Trump's victory in the 2024 presidential election, there are no signs that US foreign policy will undergo significant changes, particularly with regard to the conflict in Ukraine. Despite Trump's campaign rhetoric, which highlighted a desire to reassess international alliances and reduce US involvement in foreign conflicts, current geopolitical conditions and domestic pressures within the United States make it difficult to predict the success of any disruptive action by Washington in the current conflict.
It is important to remember that, although Trump has presented himself as a leader opposed to "endless wars" and has advocated, on several occasions, a more isolationist stance, his previous presidency has already shown that, when confronted with the realities of global power and the strategic commitments of the United States, he has maintained policies largely aligned with the interests of the so-called "political class" and the military-industrial complex. During his first term, Trump adopted an assertive approach towards Russia, even while at the same time making ambiguous statements and demonstrating a certain sympathy for Vladimir Putin. The continuation of military support for Ukraine and the tightening of sanctions against Russia are examples of how his foreign policy, despite his promises of disengagement, has been sensitive to domestic pressures and the need to maintain the position of the United States as the leader of the West – even if to some extent acknowledging the beginning of a more polycentric order.
With his re-election, the continuation of the policy of support for Ukraine could be a direct reflection of this reality. The current geopolitical context – with the ongoing war in Ukraine, Moscow's resistance to any attempt at external interference in its strategic environment, and the intensification of global tensions – ensures that the United States, regardless of its leadership, will maintain an aggressive stance towards Russia. Military and financial support for Kiev could continue under Trump, albeit with adjustments in terms of volume and type of assistance. Trump may try to reduce the level of direct US commitment, but pressure from the political establishment, the defense industry, and European allies, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, is likely to prevent any drastic change.
Furthermore, electoral considerations and the need to maintain a Republican base that still sees Russia as a significant threat make it difficult for Trump to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward Moscow. Although the former president has spoken out against the continued escalation of the conflict, advocating negotiations and suggesting that European allies should take a more active role, the chances of a real de-escalation remain low. Trump cannot simply ignore the commitments made by the United States to NATO and its allies in Europe, which, in turn, have shown no willingness to accept any form of substantial concessions to Russia, especially regarding Russian territorial claims in the already reintegrated regions.
Furthermore, the domestic situation in the United States could make any attempt at change even more difficult. The opposition of key figures in Congress, both Republican and Democratic, to the idea of a deal with Russia is likely to keep support for Ukraine, if not intact, at least secure to some degree. American foreign policy is largely determined by the military-industrial complex, which sees prolonging the war as a way to fuel demand for weapons and strengthen the US position as the dominant provider of security in the global market. There is no indication that Trump has the ability, or even the interest, to challenge this system in favor of a deal with Moscow.
Finally, while Trump's campaign rhetoric suggested a shift in US priorities, in practice his victory will not significantly alter the dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine. Pressure from European allies and the US' own domestic political apparatus will ensure that support for Kiev continues, albeit in less visible forms or with a greater focus on indirect assistance such as mercenaries and intelligence. Russia should therefore prepare for a continuation of the Western policy of containment of its leadership in Eurasia, with the Trump administration likely to focus on trying to negotiate an end to hostilities in a way that favors US interests rather than a genuine peaceful resolution that involves significant concessions to Moscow.
Ultimately, the Trump administration, with all its rhetoric of "America First," will be hostage to the complex and deep structures of US domestic power and NATO demands. What seemed like a possible reorientation in relations with Russia will probably become just another chapter in the continuity of Western policy of confrontation, with some tactical modifications but with little chance of substantial transitions.
In fact, without Kamala Harris, the chance of nuclear escalation in the conflict is reduced, but the end of hostilities will not be achieved by American will, but by the Russian assessment that the objectives of the special military operation have been achieved – which will certainly still take some time to happen.
Whoever is endowed with even a modest capacity for political thinking will easily recognise the crooked game and the malignant rules by which it is being played.
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This question is rhetorical, of course, because such an event was never scheduled. The properly formulated question is why a classical colour revolution isn't now in progress in Moldova, after the fraudulent elections that recently took place in that country? The blatantly unfair "electoral" process which resulted in Maia Sandu's alleged victory, critical to the collective West as its adventure in Ukraine turns into a debacle, meets all the criteria that should have triggered a "spontaneous" colour revolution of the sort to which we had grown painfully accustomed.
But instead of facing civil turbulence for the dishonestly conducted 3 November Presidential election, on the contrary, fervent NATO and EU advocate and World Economic Forum Young Leader Sandu has been effusively praised and warmly congratulated on her bogus triumph.
At the same time, a concerted attempt to provoke regime change using classical colour revolution instruments is being made in Georgia. So far, it has fizzled out not for lack of trying but because of the political maturity shown by the Georgian people, who refused to take the bait. The pretext was the allegedly disputed parliamentary election in Georgia, the numerical result of which favouring the governing party (about 54%) and the opposition (45%) roughly corresponds to the contrastingly acceptable outcome in Moldova. What was the crucial difference? It was chiefly the geopolitical orientation of the respective governments that in those elections were up for public approval and the fact that the "non-governmental organisations" which on command trigger regime change agitation are under the control of collective West intelligence agencies. Those agencies, in turn, and the governments whose instructions they execute, operate not with a factual but a utilitarian concept of what is a fair and free election. If as in Moldova the outcome serves collective West's goals the election is fair; if as in Georgia it hinders them, it is fraudulent. Things are quiet in Moldova because local hirelings there were ordered not to stir up public discontent whilst in Georgia they were issued the opposite directive.
The other noteworthy difference is that the egregious irregularities of the electoral process in Moldova are amply documented whilst allegations of similar misconduct in Georgia remain unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. But in the rules based order that hardly matters.
The completely utilitarian nature of the assessments, by Western political institutions and media at least, of whether an election was legitimate or not, is demonstrated by the fact that the large segment of the Moldavian electorate residing in Russia, estimated to number about half a million, were effectively disenfranchised from the voting process. That was accomplished by drastically reducing to just a handful the number of Moldovan polling stations on Russian territory and making available only 10,000 paper ballots (curiously, it did not occur to anyone in Kishinev to use Dominion voting machines instead) to those Moldovan citizens residing in Russia who managed to overcome all obstacles in order to exercise their right to vote.
On the other hand, to stress the Moldovan regime's strict adherence to "European values", no hindrances were placed in the way of the Moldovan diaspora in the European Union to take part in presidential elections in the country to which they may have a connection but where they do not reside. The Moldovan regime's calculus was that the bulk of the Moldovans living and employed in the EU have a private interest to not disrupt Moldova's European Union accession process, however remote the prospects, because their legal residence in Europe and consequently the jobs they hold there enabling them to send remittances to relatives in impoverished Moldova depend on it. Unlike Moldovans residing in Russia, that segment of the Moldovan diaspora are highly motivated out of economic self-interest to vote for Maia Sandu and her pro-European policies. In the referendum to enshrine the goal of EU accession within the Moldovan Constitution, held under identically unequal conditions and simultaneously with the first round of presidential elections on 20 October, it was the vote of the Moldovan diaspora residing in the EU which enabled the proposed measure to prevail, albeit with a razor-thin margin of a fraction of a single percentage point.
In both instances, the majority of the people actually living in Moldova, who were to be most directly affected by the outcome of the voting, did not support either their government's pro-European Union policy or the election of Western puppet Maia Sandu to the presidency of their country. Results favourable to Western interests were achieved by resorting to corrupt practices and flagrant electoral engineering.
Understandably therefore a colour revolution was not engendered in the aftermath of the recent elections in Moldova, although all the objective conditions from Gene Sharp's playbook for launching one have been fulfilled. It suffices to recall in this regard one of the fundamental triggers which in the past have led to the overthrow of numerous legitimate governments that were indisposed to bow to the political dictates laid down by arrogant Western hegemons.
Sharp's doctrine prescribes that a close election result facilitates ideally the task of professionally organised and amply financed colour revolutionaries in need of a plausible pretext to mobilise and direct the clueless masses. That is because it lends credibility to the allegation of malfeasance levelled against of the targeted "regime" and fuels a sense of grievance among the populace, who supposedly were cheated out of effectively asserting their political will.
Such malfeasance is precisely what happened in Moldova but did not occur in Georgia. But Moldova is covered by a tight and, unlike Georgia, unsupervised network of Western financed "NGOs," which by default exercise a monopoly on disinformation and "civil society" activities. Consequently, in Moldova there is no movement to denounce flagrant systemic fraud or to challenge the legitimacy of the regime of foreign vassals who base their rule on the simulacrum of authority derived from that fraud. That is because, as we explained, the criteria that are applied always are unabashedly utilitarian; "constructive" fraud as in Moldova, which serves the interests of the puppeteers, is always proper and irreproachable.
Honest elections, as in Georgia, which go against the grain always and irrespective of the factual matrix are denounced as fraudulent.
Whoever is endowed with even a modest capacity for political thinking will easily recognise the crooked game and the malignant rules by which it is being played.
Kiev está usando a morte certa no front de Kursk para punir soldados rebeldes que se negam a cumprir ordens na guerra suicida contra a Federação Russa.
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São muitas as evidências que indicam que as forças armadas da Ucrânia estão perto do colapso absoluto. Após quase três anos de combates intensos contra a Rússia, o regime de Kiev não parece mais ter força suficiente para manter os esforços de guerra da forma como vinha fazendo anteriormente. Apesar da quantidade quase infinita de dinheiro, armas e mercenários ocidentais no campo de batalha, diversas condições materiais e psicológicas estão tornando impossível a continuidade da capacidade operacional e estratégica da Ucrânia.
Desde 2022, uma das principais questões internas do regime de Kiev era como manter os militares comuns ativos no campo de batalha, apesar de seus lações familiares, étnicos e culturais com a Rússia – ademais da descrença em qualquer possibilidade de vitória real no campo de batalha. Foram muitos os reportes desde o começo da operação de militares ucranianos que de alguma forma se negaram a cumprir ordens ou se revoltaram contra seus oficiais, sendo punidos pelos batalhões neonazistas – que são os reais defensores do regime do Maidan.
Agora, aparentemente, a Ucrânia encontrou o destino "perfeito" para seus "soldados rebeldes" – o front de Kursk. Não é mais segredo para ninguém que a invasão suicida ucraniana da região sul da Rússia não tem qualquer objetivo militar claro. Inicialmente, havia a intenção de desviar a atenção russa do Donbass, bem como de provocar terror nuclear, possivelmente capturado a usina local. Nenhum destes objetivos foi alcançado e as trincheiras de Kursk são hoje mero "moedor de carne" para as tropas ucranianas.
Em um governo racional, a decisão correta seria interromper a operação, recuar as tropas e pensar em um novo planejamento estratégico. Contudo, racionalidade e estratégia não fazem parte do processo decisório ucraniano. O regime decidiu aproveitar a situação crítica das tropas para criar uma espécie de "campo de punição" para soldados desobedientes. Na situação atual, militares vistos como "rebeldes", desertores e "traidores" são enviados para Kursk, de onde dificilmente são capazes de retornar.
Recentemente, o serviço de segurança russo publicou relatórios explicando como o inimigo está usando Kursk para punir seus próprios soldados. Em seguida, o caso foi confirmado por um soldado ucraniano identificado como "Alexandr". Em entrevista para a mídia ocidental, ele informou que houve um motim em Kurakhovo, República Popular de Donetsk, por parte da 116ª brigada do exército. Exaustos e sem condições de continuarem lutando, os soldados fizeram uma espécie de "greve", exigindo rotatividade no serviço. A reação dos comandantes foi simplesmente brutal, prendendo os amotinados e enviando-os para uma missão suicida em Kursk.
De fato, a prática do "front punitivo" não é nova. Diversos exércitos usaram este método ao longo da história, tentando punir seus próprios soldados ao enviá-los em missões suicidas, das quais dificilmente seriam capazes de voltar. O principal problema deste tipo de atitude é que dificilmente há boas expectativas para o lado que começou a implementá-la. O mais vital em um exército para continuar lutando durante uma situação de conflito é o desejo de defender o país, acreditando nos valores nacionais e na necessidade proteger o povo e a pátria. Se este aspecto moral e psicológico é removido, nada é capaz de impedir o soldado de priorizar seus próprios interesses pessoais e sua busca natural pela sobrevivência, ignorando os propósitos nacionais.
É possível dizer que a Rússia já venceu o conflito atual por uma razão muito simples: os ucranianos não querem mais lutar. Para os soldados do regime, a guerra é um fardo. Tudo o que eles querem é sair do front. Kiev piora ainda mais esta situação ao deixar claro que lutar nas missões mais difíceis do conflito é uma "punição" – algo a ser evitado. Enquanto isso, a maior parte do pessoal militar russo na operação é formada por voluntários que desejam deliberadamente defender o país contra o inimigo ocidental.
Moral e psicologicamente, a Ucrânia já está derrotada. A experiência em Kursk deixa claro que, para Moscou, a vitória é mera questão de tempo.
Daniel MCCARTHY
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Donald Trump has won a victory even more stunning than his upset defeat of Hillary Clinton eight years ago. Two impeachments, relentless lawfare and innumerable criminal charges, two assassination attempts, and an unceasing chorus of the nation's most powerful media calling him a "fascist" could not stop Trump. In the teeth of all that adversity, Trump has only grown stronger. And now he has the symbolic yet potent mandate of a popular-vote majority.
That majority adds psychological force that makes the Trump revolution cultural as well as political. Before, it was easy for Trump's critics to believe his 2016 victory was a fluke. They might have to deal with its consequences, including the impetus his election gave to a populist turn within the institutions of the conservative movement. But once Trump was out of office, those institutions would sooner or later revert to their former character. After all, populism didn't have money behind it. If it didn't have people, either, it wouldn't be around for long.
But now there's a Trump majority. The Trump movement isn't some rogue ideological faction or a personality cult only interested in its celebrity leader. Trump and Trumpism speak to, and for, America's democratic majority. Every institution of American life, conservative or otherwise, has to adjust to that.Trump has shattered the laws of political physics. Realignments that had already begun as a result of Trump's earlier success are accelerating. To appreciate the magnitude of what Trump achieved in this election, look beyond the states he won—in blue state after blue state, Trump made enormous, often double-digit gains. He made deep inroads into the Hispanic vote, particularly among men. Meanwhile, neoconservatives who held out hope of retaking the commanding heights of the Republican party if Trump was defeated have little choice now but to accept a place in the Democratic coalition. But they may not be comfortable there, either, as Democrats crack up over Israel's war with Hamas.
This does not mean that four years from now the Republican nominee will be competitive in every blue state or will win a majority of Hispanics, and it certainly doesn't mean that the GOP will be without a hawkish wing and some ostensibly pro-Trump neoconservative influences. The changes that Trump brings about are not necessarily linear. But they will afford opportunities hardly imaginable before this point. And J.D. Vance is well-equipped to make the most of them in 2028.
Although foreign policy was not voters' top priority either this year or when Trump first won the presidency, war and the way leaders in both parties respond to it—or fail to respond—establishes conditions conducive to ideological mutation. How Trump handles the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East that he inherits from President Biden will be a watershed. Democrats who were reluctant to criticize U.S. support for Israel while that support was coming from the Biden-Harris administration will now hammer Trump over Israel's actions. Can Trump make good on the faith placed in him both by Arab-American voters in Michigan and by ardent supporters of Israel? Can the green shoots of a return to realism in Republican foreign policy survive the burdens of responsibility that the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine impose? The wars themselves may not be America's responsibility, but the administration will face tough choices about what not to do as well as what to do.
The possibility of wide-ranging new tariffs exists alongside the possibility that the Federal Reserve may be audited and compelled to answer to the public by the new administration. Moves in either of these directions would send shockwaves through Wall Street. Could the Trump administration be skillful enough to remake the fiscal and monetary systems without causing panic? If not, what milder measures could the administration undertake that would still address trade imbalances and inflation? Trump is open to considering a much wider range of possibilities than conventional politicians would dare to imagine, and even if his administration doesn't avail itself of those possibilities, the mere fact the president would consider them will redraw the boundaries of policy discourse in Washington and beyond.
The president will be confronted by stiff opposition within the federal bureaucracy as well as from Democrats in Congress. He should not flinch from forcing reform on the administrative state and dismantling entire departments of the federal government. In this, too, Trump can be transformative. His experiences during his first term with leaks and policy sabotage originating from the bureaucracy should inform his handling of the civil service this time. It has been a power unto itself for far too long, and it has pursued not a disinterested agenda in the service of the public but a partisan agenda in the service of liberal elites.
New electoral maps, new issue coalitions, a new balance of power within the executive branch—all of these are just some of the domestic effects of Trump's triumph. It also has the potential to inspire, or amplify, such changes all around the world. The precedent Trump has set is not only one that populist parties in Europe and elsewhere will take to heart. Mainstream parties that until now had looked to elite liberal opinion in the United States for guidance and guidelines will henceforth have to do some new thinking of their own, incorporating something of Trumpism into their dealings with America and perhaps into their politics at home. Emmanuel Macron joined Benjamin Netanyahu as the first of the world's leaders to congratulate Trump on X last night.
The political and cultural aftershocks of Trump's victory will not by themselves be enough to make the new administration a success—much hard work and resilience in the face of inevitable setbacks will be necessary, as in more pedestrian administrations. There is also a need for conservatives outside of government to answer the call the moment presents to be both creative and disciplined. The right needs renovation, including in the way it approaches art and literature. Just as Trump has shown that a new majority can be forged in battles no one else would dare fight, the right may be capable of achieving greater things in the realm of culture and philosophy than it has so far been brave enough to imagine. What's needed is not just a Trumpist or populist cultural program—though Hulk Hogan certainly has his place in America's affections—but a cultural program as bold as Trump's political challenge to the obsolete elite.
Trump should reawaken conservatives' spirit of endeavor. Because he has dared greatly and succeeded.
Humanity is us, not them. Not those who still seek to subjugate peoples and divide in order to rule. Not those who want slavery and homogenization.
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The West having reached the end of its days is no longer fascinating to anyone. It is not only so politically and economically, but it is also so culturally. On the other hand, culture is political, because if politics is the "caring for the Common Good," as Aristotle wrote, and culture is the totality of manifestations of the material, social and spiritual life of a people, then culture is profoundly political because it is the ordinary, everyday expression of politics.
As an alternative to what has been imposed by the West as the only "model of civilization," the need to reaffirm the cultures and civilizational patterns of each of the world's peoples is strongly emerging, and leading this gradual transition are once again the multipolar partnerships, foremost among them the BRICS+.
Defining soft power in culture
A preliminary notion needs to be clarified: what is soft power. So we will try to understand whether culture can be soft power.
The term "soft power" was introduced into global strategic doctrine by Harvard political scientist and former director of the Kennedy School of Government, Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs of the United States of America. Joseph Nye defines power broadly as the ability of an entity (a country, a nongovernmental organization, an isolated individual, among other possibilities) to get what it wants from another entity.
The protagonists have a variety of forces at their disposal. In Nye's theory, the arsenal of means used to coerce (the logic of threat is at play here, often through military means) or to incite (through the delivery of quid pro quo or the granting of concessions, often financial) is distinguished from the ability to seduce. Coercion ("the stick") and inducement ("the carrot") are defined as the tools of hard power that takes the form of relatively tangible force. The ability to seduce, on the other hand, corresponds to a more subtle field of action, that of soft power, which is not under the control of the government as much as hard power. Broad and robust soft power requires the active and free participation of civil society and is thus more characteristic of liberal societies. In 1939, British philosopher Edward Carr drew a similar distinction between powers in the international context: he separated military power, economic power and the power of opinion. Joseph Nye simply proposes to renew and refine an already latent terminology to identify logics of power as old as human history.
There are three ways to implement this power identified by Nye: culture, values and foreign policy. These elements are effective resources of soft power only when they can claim, respectively, to be attractive to a foreign nation (in the case of culture), to be followed both at home and abroad (in the case of values), and to be considered legitimate and morally authoritative (in the case of foreign policies).
In the broad scheme of soft power vectors, culture is very often seen as the most obvious source of influence vis-à-vis foreign nations. Values and practices create meaning for a society. Making meanings means making sense of everything. Nothing could be more powerful. A war if it is not dense with meaning will not be fought; an economic reform if it has no deep reason, it will not be implemented; an international partnership if it is not well motivated, it will not be followed by anyone.
Soft power in culture will have to respect the two levels of culture: the "high" culture, that is, which concerns the elites, academia, and science, and is therefore particularly rich, detailed, and does not settle for trivial and superficial models; and the "low" culture, which in America took the name "pop," which is instead for the masses, is based on simplifications and superficiality, commercializes everything, and is easier to implement.
The obstacles to the development of soft power lie not in the nature of cultural resources, but in their degree of openness: a nation with narrow values and culture is unlikely to win other societies to its model. In contrast, cultures with universalistic tendencies, such as that of the United States, are able to win over heterogeneous groups of individuals in very different parts of the world. Nye likes to compare the influence of American power to that of the Roman Empire, the difference being that Rome's influence stopped where its troops were able to establish themselves, while the glory of the United States spans almost the entire globe.
With the rapid development of digital communication technologies, especially instant messaging applications and social networks, soft power has reached a new level. Now everything is faster and soft power is increasingly important in determining who the real powers are, overriding military and economic resources. The new standard is no longer just to "produce information" but to "share information". The countries destined to gain the most in soft power will be those that, on the one hand, prioritize the diversity of communication channels and, on the other, imbue their content with globally recognized values.
In the new logic, liberalism, pluralism and the autonomy of citizens to formulate their own opinions are bound to become essential criteria for the development of soft power. The state, for its part, is forced to come to terms with the new voices being heard. At best, it seems destined to become just another actor. In the field of this soft and volatile power, which is not easy to manage, it is conceivable that governmental units will be relegated to a secondary role, behind the masses of citizens, who validate the credibility of messages, integrate or reject cultural waves, and make and unmake, slowly and without always being aware of it, the degrees of soft power.
Today's China is well aware of the centrality of culture as a tool of soft power. Since the 1990s, the Party-State's guidelines have put culture at the center, progressively developing a greater focus on the cultural sector as a pillar industry of the economy. In China's journey toward achieving the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and becoming a "great socialist cultural power," the cultural industry has been given the function of an essential tool for exercising soft power both at home and abroad.
Russia is also investing a great deal in a special cultural operation, in which it will reformulate its national culture in a Russocentric key, no longer geared toward running behind the collective West, rewriting school and academic curricula, promoting domestic policy reforms on welfare issues, and carefully curating the mass media. Such a shift is necessary for the preparation of future generations.
No cultural revolution can be made over short periods; it is always necessary to look deep into history.
The BRICS indirect approach through economics and cultural transformation
Think of BRICS+: a global geoeconomic partnership made up of diverse ethnicities and cultures. The first impression is that this plurality makes the integration and establishment of a unified soft power complicated. Second, we need to define the conjunction between the geoeconomic intent of BRICS with the political specificities of cultural soft power.
Great diversity not only does not inhibit the effectiveness of BRICS as a bloc, but rather increases the effectiveness of BRICS as a vehicle for generating soft power in the international system for its member countries. Greater diversity means greater influence.
To the extent that BRICS countries can come together to pursue common interests that do not depend on the specific characteristics of each nation (political, social, economic), a process of functional "non-differentiation" occurs within the bloc. Very different states can come together to function effectively as an organic bloc. Non-differentiation is particularly important because in terms of individual soft power profiles the BRICS are truly different.
As Gallarotti brilliantly noted , already the founding fathers of the partnership are an example of blending: Brazil's soft power derives from the confluence of a history of pacifism (few armed conflicts), deficiencies in hard power (a relatively modest military and no WMD) and a vigorous foreign policy of leadership in multilateral organizations. South Africa boasts one of the most liberal constitutions in the world and a liberal democratic transformation hallowed by the rise of international icon Nelson Mandela. Its political transition in the 1990s coincided with a foreign policy, like Brazil's, of broad multilateral engagement to achieve status as a major soft power broker on the global stage. India's soft power is cultural and political. It boasts an epic culture and the home of four religions. Bollywood is the largest film production center in the world. Its diaspora is 25 million strong and has endured as the world's only stable democracy in an ethnically and politically fractured nation. China has built the most elaborate and systematic mechanism for managing soft power, called the "charm offensive," which includes everything from the global promotion of Confucian thought to building friendship networks with African nations from which it imports raw materials. But even more so than in the other BRICS, the role of soft power (which is aimed at powering the economic machine-i.e., securing sources of energy and markets for exports) is deliberately integrated with a hard power initiative aimed at raising China's stature as a great power (i.e., powering the military machine as well). The dualism explained by Sun Zu between "zheng" (direct means) and "qi" (indirect means) represents opposing strategies that are synthesized into an intelligent or cosmopolitan power strategy. This is why the Chinese do not conceive of soft power and hard power as distinct spaces, an ideology that no other BRICS nation shares to the same extent.
Let us dwell on China again, because it deserves attention to understand the unified strategy of BRICS+. The Chinese are great at formulating strategies over the long term, with many details and particulars. China alone has invested more than all other BRICS members in soft power and is even trying to build a film industry that can compete with the Indian media empire. On the high cultural level, think of the proliferation of Confucian institutes around the world, or the commitment to the dissemination of excellent music, but also the great interest in classical Mediterranean culture (for example, the greatest number of studies on Plato's philosophy are carried out in China, with an integration between the millennia-old Chinese and Hellenic traditions). In doing so, the shortcomings left by state communism are being filled and topics such as family, obedience and authority – proper to traditional Confucianism – are being rediscovered and integrated. Global superpower status is centered on controlling the hybrid dominance of culture.
Russia is also enhancing cultural soft power within the partnership. Foreign policy under Russia's BRICS chairmanship in the year 2024 has been centered on an enormous amount of forums, meetings, and conferences on all kinds of cultural spheres, from information to sports, film to literature, fashion to food. Nothing is left to chance; all the elements that make up the definition of "culture" must be involved.
This great cultural diversity of BRICS+ countries fosters increased soft power. Why? Because in the eyes of the West, this diversity is seen as an obstacle to integration, as a problem of mutual influence among members and as an impediment to the compactness of the economic bloc or regional strategic alliances. This shortsightedness is typical of the American perspective, which is totalizing and does not allow for respectful integrations outside a single plan. But this is the real multipolar richness: unity in diversity, multiple richness coordinating for a common good.
The geographic spread and diversity of the BRICS is also an advantage because it offers more possibilities for engagement for regional alliances and with other countries outside the partnership. It is a matter of spatiality: the wider the perimeter, the greater the points of contact.
Ideologically, the variety of political positions is a fascination capable of attracting the most disparate lines of government, particularly among socialist-minded countries, but also states undergoing development and political transition (as is happening in Africa).
In order not to disperse efforts, the partnership continually promotes opportunities for complementarity, with each member offering its soft power profile. Temporally speaking, diversity is particularly fortunate because it allows for a rotation of balances, so when one country experiences a weakening phase, here is another country compensates. Thus, the organic and integrated soft power of the BRICS remains almost stable.
Also as part of the complementarity between hard and soft power, each BRICS member now has a diplomatic support group within each of the organizations to which it belongs. This bloc can be useful for setting agendas, creating a voting bloc, and/or generating a diplomatic wedge that can be used to promote the interests of each BRICS nation. Strengthening the bloc works through various forms of power associations. Certainly the support of the superpowers gives Indian, Brazilian, and South African diplomats greater diplomatic capital. But support from developing nations also generates diplomatic capital for the superpowers through legitimacy. In terms of soft power dispersion, this mix may work best when there is greater diversity, as the possibilities for complementarity increase as diversity increases.
It bears saying: opposites attract.
The racist, colonialist, imperialist West that no one believes in anymore
Let us come to the point. What does the West propose? The rise of new forms of influence and power springs from a malaise that had reached an excess. The West has propagated racism against civilizational models other than "its own"-because it is in itself impossible to define the genesis of a Western civilizational model, while we have multiple models of multiple Western societies, but all of which went under the UK-U.S. hegemony of liberal-capitalism during modernity and under the military and economic aegis of the U.S. during the twentieth century. Other peoples, other civilizations, other cultures are perhaps interesting, but nothing more, so they must be educated to the Western model, by good or bad means. Democracy is exported with bombs, ideologically different governments are brought down with coups and colored revolutions, markets are forcibly tied to the dollar, culture is invaded and commodified with junk products. This is what the West has accomplished, gradually destroying the civilizations within it and attacking those outside.
Colonialism has been a prime example of this operational logic. First that of European states to Africa and South America, then the American one that took its place, putting even the Old Continent called Europe under dependence.
It is clear that this offer is no longer appealing to anyone. "The West and the Rest" no longer works: the "Rest" leaves the orbit of power of the "West". It could not fail to go this way. The claim of imperialist homogenization, destruction and control of cultures and civilizations has proven to be a suicidal choice for the West. History is showing this to the whole world. BRICS+, but multipolar world theory in general, teaches us that plurality and diversity are not a risk and danger to be contained and clumsily exploited, but are the wealth that makes fruitful the world in which this humanity lives.
Humanity is us, not them. Not those who still seek to subjugate peoples and divide in order to rule. Not those who want slavery and homogenization. Pax Multipolaris is a common project that belongs to us.
Discontent is growing, not only among ordinary people in the bloc's countries, but also among influential sectors of the European political and economic elites.
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Former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi recently presented a comprehensive report to the European Union that demonstrates how Europeans are falling behind Americans – and even Asians – on key issues of economic development.
While in 1990, GDP per capita in the United States was 16% higher than in the eurozone, by 2023 that gap had already grown to more than 30%. This means that Americans are increasingly richer than Europeans.
But the gap between the richest men in the United States and Europe is also widening. Only 10% of high-tech entrepreneurs in the top 30 and top 500 of the market capitalization rankings are European. By comparison, 73% in the first and 56% in the second are American.
These new figures once again reveal the economic devastation of Europe. And its origins are directly linked to American power.
By the 1930s, the United States had lost all the advantage it had gained over its European competitors at the end of World War I. Europe was devastated and Washington had emerged as the world's great economic superpower. However, the 1929 crisis brought this strength to an end. The Great Depression seemed to have put an end to the American dream.
Just as World War I was a dispute between imperialist powers over the world market, the future World War II needed to be unleashed so that the Americans could regain control – partially lost to Germany and Japan in the wake of the 1930s crisis. Franklin D. Roosevelt led the reorganization of the American economy, vastly expanding federal spending and making large public investments thanks to a dictatorial centralization of economic power in the hands of a small corporate monopoly.
The result was an unimaginable increase in industrial production – focused almost exclusively on the war. Pearl Harbor came in very handy: it was the excuse the regime needed to eliminate opposition to its entry into the conflict. Between 1941 and 1944, U.S. war production more than tripled, and by 1944 its factories were producing twice as much as Germany, Italy and Japan.
American industrial production served two intertwined strategic objectives: to destroy Europe and to rebuild it in its image and likeness. The U.S. equipped Britain with the weapons needed to confront Germany, and both carried out an intense bombing campaign with the explicit intention of destroying the German economy, the industrial engine of Europe. Almost 2.7 million tons of bombs were dropped on Germany and the Nazi-occupied regions of other countries, particularly France and Belgium (completing the industrial heartland of Europe). American and British aerial bombings killed 305,000 Germans, injured almost 800,000, totally or partially destroyed 5.5 million homes, and left 20 million without essential public services.
It was genocide. Added to the immediate slaughter of 330,000 civilians in Japan by the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. bombings took the lives of 635,000 people.
The U.S. destruction of Europe was a big deal that benefited the United States decisively in securing its total supremacy in the new postwar world order. The deficit of foreign countries in 1946-47 was more than $19 billion. The U.S., which was intact, offered loans to begin the reconstruction of Europe as a soft form of colonization, while at the same time punishing those countries severely. In the words of the unsuspecting establishment historian Arthur S. Link, "the American government, even during the bitter days of Reconstruction, had never taken such terrible revenge on former enemies." The German people and institutions were reformed "in the image of the United States."
The Truman Doctrine and, mainly, the Marshall Plan, were the pillars of the U.S.'s post-World War II policy of colonizing Europe: the first transformed all of Western Europe and part of its southeast into a huge American military base, through NATO, policing the politics of these countries. The second began as a clientelist policy, granting handouts to starving Europeans (11 billion dollars) that were later returned with interest, beginning the process of economic, political and social dependence on Europe. Between 1948 and 1951, another 12 billion dollars had been spent in this regard.
Combating the false threat of the Soviet Union was the excuse found by the American government to capture Europe. "The greatest nation on earth," declared the Republican Arthur Vandenberg before the Senate, "will have to justify or abandon its leadership." This was how the United States managed to overcome a crisis of overproduction and sell its goods and weapons, while at the same time leaving the Europeans hostage to their accumulated debts. American products invaded Europe and NATO began to control the national armies.
On the one hand, the post-World War II subjugation of Europe resulted in relative well-being for the population, which resulted in social stability. However, following the second major American colonization strategy – deindustrialization with the imposition of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s – this welfare state was dismantled, leaving Europeans completely hostage to the United States.
In all countries around the world, the main body responsible for scientific research and development is the armed forces. However, Europe's armies have become vassals of the United States through NATO and their capacity has been reduced to increase that of the American forces on the continent. The report commissioned by the EU from Draghi highlights the harmful consequences of this subjugation for Europe.
According to the report, Europeans spend half as much as Americans on research and development in relation to GDP, and many European businesspeople prefer to migrate to the United States to develop these activities. R&D spending relative to GDP in the European Union is also lower than that of China, the United Kingdom, Taiwan and South Korea. The EU has already been overtaken by China in the number of articles published in leading scientific journals, and Japan and India are hot on its heels – while the U.S. remains ahead. Europe's economic capacity for innovation also remains below that of the U.S. and Japan. It has already fallen behind in the development of digital technology.
Draghi suggests a series of "drastic measures" to combat the growing gap between the U.S. and Europe, according to Politico. However, these measures are unlikely to have any effect, since the EU's policy remains absolutely aligned (i.e. dependent) on that of the United States and no significant measures have been adopted recently that indicate a different path from that taken in recent decades.
This is why there is growing discontent, not only among ordinary people in the bloc's countries, but also among influential sectors of the European political and economic elites. The growth of the far right in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, as well as the quest by the governments of Hungary and Slovakia for greater sovereignty, are clear reflections of this trend.
A derrota de Kamala é a vitória da demagogia política, do messianismo providencialista e do Supremacismo.
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Imigração, aborto, wokismo, guerra da Ucrânia, guerras eternas, reindustrialização e proteccionismo. Com excepção do aborto e wokismo (identitarismo), que se tratam de questões de consciência e não de política estrutural, todas representam, de alguma forma, algumas das consequências mais brutais do neoliberalismo nos EUA, figurando entre as grandes causas da derrota de Kamala e da vitória de Trump.
A desindustrialização, esgrimida por Trump como uma das grandes causas da perda de poderio da sua américa, aconteceu como causa directa da financeirização da economia (acelerada pelo Republicano Nixon) tornando a economia de casino no motor económico dos EUA. Sem indústria veio a deterioração do poder real resolvido com a criação de conflitos eternos. As guerras eternas comportam um penoso custo sobre a economia ocidental (também na Europa) e um entrave ao investimento público em infra-estruturas e outras necessidades. A pilhagem que possibilitam à Blackrock, Monsanto, Golden Sachs e outras, não reverte para o povo norte-americano, mas para acumulação de uns poucos.
Como forma de desviar atenções, assustar e anestesiar as massas, recupera-se a russofobia, a guerra fria e promove-se o identitarismo, provocando a atomização social e a fractura dos movimentos sociais que poderiam contestar, de forma consistente e coerente, esta situação. O resultado é a instalação de um sentimento de instabilidade e precariedade, relativamente a todos os aspectos da vida.
Trump surgiu como a solução que concretizará a aspiração à estabilidade e a uma certa "normalidade" nos costumes, na economia, no trabalho, na família. Kamala nunca se libertou da acusação de que pretende a continuidade dos factores que causam esta desagregação social.
A anunciada vitória de Trump demonstra que os "sucessos" económicos de Biden não eram reconhecidos pela população. Os ganhos oligárquicos, nunca chegaram ao bolso dos trabalhadores. O Partido Democrata recusou-se a constatar esse facto, ao fazê-lo, garantiu a vitória de Trump.
Explicada a causa, falta então estabelecer os seus constituintes, que passo a enumerar, de forma aleatória:
Trump utilizou de forma magistral esta bandeira, capitalizando factores como o medo de uma guerra mundial, a opacidade do complexo-militar industrial, o seu descontrolo nas despesas e o facto de operar para além das regras democráticas, sem auditoria, escrutínio ou necessidade de justificar os gastos. Acresce que, a mais do que previsível derrota da NATO na Ucrânia, traz consigo outra novidade, que consiste num certo descrédito na mítica – mas nunca comprovada – capacidade militar dos EUA. Trump apresentou-se como o candidato que iria resolver os conflitos eternos, libertando o povo americano desse fardo, mas, ao mesmo tempo, recuperando o misticismo militar perdido. Uma espécie de nacionalismo do fim dos impérios, pelo qual todos passam.
Este pressuposto tem dois problemas: o primeiro, é que o discurso da paz, e do fim da guerra, deveria, conceptualmente, estar do lado de Kamala; o segundo, é que, acreditar que Trump conseguirá, quererá, sequer, colocar um ponto final no militarismo norte americano, é, no mínimo, risível. Trump até pode arrefecer alguns conflitos, mas agravará outros, em linha com a sua prepotência e narcisismo, próprias do providencialismo ideológico norte-americano comum a todas as suas poderosas facções.
Como se verá, contudo, Trump não apenas aumentará os gastos militares, em linha com o que prevê o Mandate 2025 da Heritage Foundation, como terá de alimentar conflitos para os justificar. Provavelmente mais conflitos frios que quentes, mas, mesmo assim, conflitos. A Europa será uma das grandes penalizadas pela sua própria cobardia. Trump não deixará de extorquir os cobardes políticos europeus, do que considera constituir a sua justa contribuição para uma NATO que só dá jeito aos EUA e a ninguém mais.
Trump alimenta-se da falta de um discurso pacifista, defendendo o fim das guerras eternas, o que não quer dizer "o fim das guerras" e, certamente, não quer dizer "o fim dos conflitos" e tensões militares.
A utilização desta bandeira não é nova. Contudo, lá como por cá, o que Trump não diz, é que, quem exige aos governos ocidentais, a abertura das "portas" migratórias, são os próprios patrões. Nenhum migrante se desloca para um país, se considerar que aí não vai encontrar trabalho. É a susceptibilidade de encontrar trabalho que os atrai. Essa informação circula pelas redes traficantes e chega aos povos mais pobres, que agarram a possibilidade.
E quem propaga a informação? Basta olhar, por exemplo, para o posicionamento das associações patronais europeias sobre o assunto. Consideram que são necessários mais migrantes. Afinal, necessitam de mão de obra barata, disponível, bem-comportada, descartável e que pressione para baixo os custos salariais dos povos autóctones. Sobre isto, Trump, a extrema direita, nada diz.
A extrema direita capitaliza, sim, e de forma massiva, os problemas de exclusão social ligados aos fluxos de migrantes e dos seus descendentes. E esta exclusão social é culpa, uma vez mais, do partido democrata. O Partido Democrata responde ao patronato com manutenção ou aumento do stock migratório, mas o dinheiro que deveria ser usado para integrar estas pessoas, e os seus filhos, é usado para a guerra e para financiar as grandes corporações. O pacote anti-inflação de Biden (o Inflaction Reduction Act) financiou, em centenas de biliões de dólares, a compra de capital em bolsa, pelas próprias corporações, para que se valorizem artificialmente. Esse dinheiro não foi usado para melhorar o acesso à saúde, habitação ou segurança social, bandeiras do Partido Democrata. Este partido foi penalizado por tratar os migrantes como os trata o Partido republicano quando está no poder.
O Partido Democrata perdeu muito do capital de confiança que a juventude norte-americana lhe colocava, na questão palestiniana. Se até aqui, mal ou bem, os jovens progressistas e os adultos antissionistas viam no Partido Democrata uma espécie de apaziguador – pelo menos –, face ao anti arabismo republicano, com Biden e Kamala, tudo se esfumou.
É com Biden e Kamala que o mundo assistiu a um inadmissível Genocídio em directo. É sob uma administração democrata que os EUA embarcaram numa guerra em duas frentes, uma das quais sob um povo indefeso e qual delas com as consequências mais imprevisíveis.
Kamala e o PD não conseguiram, desta forma, estabelecer uma diferença substancial para Trump e se alguém capitalizou voto, nesta matéria, terá sido mesmo a candidatura deste último. Pelo menos terá captado algum voto a que antes não teria tido acesso. O facto de defender o fim das guerras eternas e dizer que não quer guerra com o Irão, acabou por estabelecer uma diferença importante, também nesta matéria.
O establishment estava convencido de que o povo norte americano gostava de Hillary Clinton. Estava enganado. Hillary era "Killary" e não nutria simpatia alguma. Os mesmos estavam convencidos de Kamala não falharia. Bastaria coloca-la à frente de um teleponto e estava resolvido. Não era preciso falar muito, e pensar, menos ainda. Ninguém conseguiu capitalizar o que quer que fosse de positivo sobre Kamala. Das vezes que ficou sem teleponto, o improviso foi estarrecedor. A sua incapacidade oratória, retórica e teórica, foi tornada evidente.
Mas o facto de ser mulher, associado ao facto de ser "Brown", não poderia falhar. A cartada tinha dado certo com Obama, porque haveria agora de falhar? Obama foi o genocida mais simpático da história. Enquanto fazia desfilar a sua enorme capacidade discursiva, encerrava crianças em jaulas na fronteira sul, ameaçava a Síria de invasão, criava condições para a entrada do Estado Islâmico na Síria e Iraque, destruía a Líbia e apoiava neonazis na Ucrânia.
Esta aposta numa figura inócua, apagada e incapaz não é nova e representa um enorme vazio de liderança real. Biden foi o último dos líderes da máquina democrata e norte americana. Gente como Cornel West, Jill Stein, ou Bernie Sanders, foram impedidos, pelos grandes doadores, de dar voz às ansiedades populares de jovens e trabalhadores. Eis a "democracy" norte americana em toda a sua extensão.
A precariedade da vida, a agrura das condições, a estagnação ideológica do sistema e o apagamento das luzes da alternativa, e com a estagnação, o apodrecimento e deterioração, associadas à ausência de alternativas, criam as contradições ideais para o surgimento de movimentos que defendem, mesmo que aparentemente apenas, a alternativa. É uma lei da vida. Se a água não for por um lado, vai pelo outro.
Contudo, o Partido Democrata, como os partidos sociais democratas na europa, foram controlados pelo neoliberalismo. A deterioração, durante os seus mandatos, dos serviços públicos tornou-se evidente, o que resultou numa desmoralização ideológica, não apenas da social democracia, mas de todas as forças progressistas e democráticas consideradas moderadas. As radicais são persona non grata e estas deixaram de constituir uma diferença efectiva para as outras forças da direita.
Quando temos um Partido Democrata a defender a hegemonia e o globalismo neoliberal, um partido socialista ou social democrata a defender a Europa neoliberal e o revisionismo histórico, aliando-se a neoliberais e neoconservadores, abre-se o espaço para o surgimento de aparências de alternativa à direita. A realidade nunca pára.
Trump, acaba a surgir como alternativa ao sistema que o constrói e de que se alimenta. E consegue-o porque o establishment transformou o sistema partidário ocidental num amplo campo de direita neoliberal e neoconservadora, em que desfilam figuras diferentes na aparência, mas iguais na substância, domadas pelas elites, apenas com o objectivo de manter a aparência de movimento democrático, quando, na prática, não existe.
Afinal, é JD Vance, Vice de Trump, quem aparece a opor-se às deslocalizações para México e China. Não deveriam ter sido os democratas a fazê-lo? Quando vemos Biden a aplicar tarifas, para que as marcas chinesas não entrem nos EUA, vale a pena perguntar se ele não se deveria ter lembrado de o fazer, com as empresas norte-americanas, que se deslocalizaram para américa latina e ásia. Porque foi o Partido Democrata conivente com a destruição da capacidade industrial dos EUA?
Não foi apenas o aborto, bandeira capitalizável numa sociedade reaccionária e muito religiosa. Não vale a pena as Kamalas do mundo virem dizer que, a um Trumpista, ou republicano tradicional, importam mais os fetos humanos do que a vida dos seres já nascidos, se depois mantêm os salários congelados durante mais de 40 anos, deixam a riqueza voltar a concentrar-se, ao nível do que acontecia nos anos 30 do século XX, não criam uma rede de cresces gratuitas, não apoiam a constituição de famílias e a natalidade, e por aí fora. O seu discurso é contraditório com o que fazem na realidade.
Onde está a moral para defender o aborto numa situação destas? Mesmo que exista, ela é muito condicionada pelo insucesso das políticas sociais do PD. Como dizer que o aborto é defensável como último recurso, quando se é responsável directo por não criar condições de apoio à natalidade, que tornam esse "ultimo recurso", no primeiro dos recursos?
A ligação do Wokismo (identitarismo) neoliberal à esquerda, e da propaganda LGBTQ aos movimentos da esquerda, é culpa também do Partido Democrata e dos partidos sociais democratas que deixaram cair o universalismo, passando a apostar na atomização da identidade e na liberalização do género.
Passam a escolher-se mulheres, homossexuais, latinos, negros, trans, apenas por o serem e não por aquilo que são. Escolher um homossexual incapaz, apenas porque o é, constitui um enorme desserviço para o movimento homo, escolher uma mulher incapaz, apenas porque o é, é um desserviço para a causa das mulheres. Uma Von Der Leyen, sendo mulher, perpetua a guerra. Um Rangel (Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Portugal), sendo homossexual, perpetua a guerra. O que ganha o povo com isto?
Usado como bandeira oportunista, o wokismo atomiza a identidade, atomiza a sociedade. A propaganda woke é usada como bandeira política e sinal de sofisticação e liberdade mental, contudo, o efeito da mesma é o de transmitir à sociedade que a sua "normalidade" está em causa. Podemos questionar se a "normalidade" comporta ou não outras identidades, mas sempre como parte de um conjunto, naturalmente. O sistema apenas deve garantir que, escolha o que se escolha, com naturalidade, se tenha direito ás mesmas condições de vida que os demais.
Ao invés, o Partido Democrata deixou apanhar-se pela ideia de que o mais importante é podermos afirmar a nossa identidade e até fazê-lo com afronta e panfletarismo. O que importa é poderes escolher ser trans, homo ou não binário, embora possas ter de viver na rua e sem emprego. Trata-se de uma inversão das prioridades. O que garante a liberdade na escolha da identidade são as condições universais básicas necessárias à sobrevivência. E não o contrário. Defender a primeira, secundarizando as segundas, transmite uma mensagem da subversão das coisas, o que destrói a aparência de normalidade e a ideia de estabilidade social. Provocando a reacção.
O Wokismo consiste numa liberalização da identidade e da possibilidade de escolha individual, em desconexão com a sua existência material. Trata-se, por isso, de um individualismo, divisivo, de um idealismo. O Partido Democrata nunca deveria embarcar num idealismo.
Ao fazê-lo, permitiu a Trump que se vendesse como o garante da normalidade. A extrema direita vende-se como garante da normalidade!
A associação de Trump a Putin e à Rússia visava capitalizar uma russofobia que nunca pegou realmente, a não ser nos que se alimentam e vivem do establishment. Ontem na Geórgia, Putin voltou à cena. Supostamente teriam vindo ameaças de bomba da Rússia. Já ninguém acredita nisto e os resultados na Geórgia demonstram uma certa e crescente imunidade popular aos golpes da imprensa corporativa.
A verdade é que já poucos acreditam em Zelensky e ainda menos conseguem ouvi-lo falar. Em total desconexão com o sentir popular, acreditaram que colocar Trump contra Zelensky, afectaria Trump. Ao contrário, deu a certeza, a muitos que duvidavam de que Trump acabaria com a guerra, de que esse era o voto certo.
Como o povo Ucraniano, também nós, ocidentais, estamos fartos desta guerra.
Toda a imprensa mainstream ocidental, mesmo a alinhada com o Partido Republicano (nos EUA têm de declarar o enviesamento partidário), fazia força por Kamala. Kamala tinha os falcões do seu lado.
A derrota da Kamala é a derrota da Imprensa corporativa. A derrota de Kamala é a derrota das narrativas encomendadas por Wallstreet, pentágono, CIA ou Casa Branca. Hoje, nos EUA, de acordo com a Gallup, já existem mais norte-americanos que não acreditam, de todo, na média mainstream, do que os que acreditam alguma coisa nela.
Trump usou isso de forma exaustiva. Da pós-verdade do primeiro mandato, ao descrédito total no segundo, Trump venceu a Imprensa Mainstream. Já Elon Musk e o seu Twitter desempenharam aqui um papel fundamental. O Twitter foi a força propagandística online de Trump. Nenhum ser deveria ter tanto poder como Musk, mas um dos responsáveis pela fabricação destes poderes "neofeudais" é o próprio Partido Democrata.
Em conclusão:
A derrota de Kamala é, assim, a vitória da demagogia política, do messianismo providencialista e do Supremacismo, do qual o Partido Democrata não se libertou e o qual também contribuiu para normalizar, permitindo a Trump ganhar, apesar dele, e da forma exacerbada como o defende. O Partido Democrata nunca o poderia desmontar na sua essência, pois os democratas também defendem a "liderança americana", a "nação indispensável", todos os slogans triunfalistas e neocolonialistas da elite estado-unidense, fabricados durante Clinton.
A vitória de Trump é a derrota das empresas de sondagens, denunciadas como instrumentos de construção de resultados, da democracia entendida com um sistema superior em que pessoas informadas e conscientes, fazem escolhas conscientes, de acordo com programas discutidos, reflectidos e debatidos.
O desfile de apoiantes de Trump sem o mínimo de decência política, intelectual ou ideológica, ou o desfile de apoiantes de Kamala sem a mínima capacidade de transmitir ideias, num e noutro caso, apenas chamados à ribalta em função da sua popularidade, constitui um dos tristes episódios deste decadente espectáculo circense, a que chamam eleições nos EUA.
Por fim, Kamala, desta feita, impediu, com a sua desinteligência, o Partido Democrata de capitalizar: os votos relacionados com a limitação do uso de armas, pois apresentou-se como alguém que as usa, falando disso com orgulho, o que não deixará de ter chocado muito boa gente; os votos dos migrantes e descendentes de migrantes, preocupados com a agressão constante, pelos EUA, aos seus países de origem (caso dos Chineses, Iranianos, Cubanos, Árabes e muitos outros); os votos pró-palestinianos e muitos votos das classes trabalhadoras.
Falhou em estabelecer uma diferença real para a política de Trump e, assim, ou provocou a desmobilização dos seus apoiantes e, pelos factores que referi, a deslocação de muitos para a outra candidatura. O peso das questões internacionais pode não ser muito grande, mas por elas vemos que pouco distancia Kamala de Trump. O que é inaceitável, em democracia.
No final a conclusão só pode ser uma: ganhasse quem ganhasse, o povo norte americano perderia sempre. Votar em Trump para resolver os problemas das condições de vida das massas trabalhadoras norte-americanas é como deixar alguém no deserto, porque esse alguém está com sede!
Vejam lá o deserto estamos enfiados!